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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WARREN IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MIL TON T. BROWN and 
FLORENCE H. BROWN, his wife, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
12620 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
One would logically assume from the fact that 
the Warren Irrigation Company (Appellant) filed the 
complaint, that its water rights are in dispute. How-
ever, this is not the case. The Respondents acquired 
80 acres of land and the water rights therefor by a 
deed dated October 23, 1939. (Ex. 9) Respondents 
receive their water through the canal system of the 
appellant company, and for the next 30 years (until 
1969) they received their full decreed water every year 
without problem or protest, and paid the assessment 
made therefor, all in accordance with the terms of a 
decree between their predecessor, Lyman Skeen, and 
the Appellant here. 
On June 5, 1969, the board of directors of the 
appellant company considered the question of limit-
ing Respondents to no more than one-half of their de-
creed water right, due to the fact that part of the la!1~ 
owned by Respondents' predecessor had been sold. 
(See the minutes of June 5, 1969 meeting, Ex. 8). The 
Company did withhold delivery of one-half of the 
water, and Respondents, in July of 1970, filed a pe-
tition for an order requiring Appellant to deliver water 
to them in accordance with the 1914 decree. (Ex. L, 
File 4677). 
The predecessors in interest of the Respondents 
had twice litigated these same water rights with the 
Warren Irrigation Co. The first litigation resulted in the 
decree, which is dated November 10, 1914. (Ex. L. 
File 4677). As we shall presently demonstrate, Lyman 
Skeen, who was the plaintiff in this 1914 action, and 
his immediate successors in interest, Mary E. Brown 
and David A. Skeen, received the water and paid the 
assessments in accordance with this 1914 decree, 
without any problem until 1937. 
In 1937 the Warren Irrigation Co. again refused 
to deliver the water, and Mary E. Brown and David A. 
Skeen filed a petition in Civil No. 4677 (Ex. L) for an 
order directing the Appellant to deliver the water, as 
provided for in the 1914 decree. This petition also re-
sulted in an order dated February 5, 1938, which as we 
shall later note in more detail, expressly confirmed 
that the petitioners were the owners of all rights de-
creed to Lyman Skeen in 1914, and directed the Ap-
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pellant to deliver the water in accordance with that de-
cree. However, although the petition, which was filed 
August 9, 1937, and the answer and other pleadings 
were properly filed in Civil No. 4677, (Ex. L) for some 
reason, the order itself, which was entered February 
5, 1938, was filed in another case between the same 
parties. in Civil No. 4201, and that order is the last 
document in Ex. L. in the part of the file which is Civil 
No. 4201. 
When Respondents filed their petition for an 
order to show cause in July, 1970, they gave it the 
number of the civil file where the 1938 order was fil-
ed. Attached to the petition were copies of both the 
1914 decree, in Civil 4677. and the order entered in 
1938. on the petition filed in Civil 4677, but as noted, 
the order was filed in Civil No. 4201. The order to 
show cause issued. there were some discovery pro-
cedures. and the matter finally came on for trial. At 
the trial. counsel for the Appellant raised for the first 
time the objection that the petition and order to show 
cause used Civil No. 4201 (which was the file where 
the 1938 order was filed) rather than Civil No. 4677 
(which is the file where the 1914 decree was entered.) 
While we didn't agree that this was a problem, it could 
be readily cured by refiling the petition for the order 
to show cause in Civil No. 4677. and the trial did not 
proceed. Before Respondents could refile their pe-
tition. the Appellant filed its complaint in this action, 
and thereby attempted to collaterally attack the earlier 
decrees. 
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The trial court, in its Finding No. 1, correctly 
noted "that the water rights of the appellant company 
are not in dispute," and that the issue between the 
parties involved the right of the Respondents to re-
ceive the water decreed to Lyman Skeen on November 
10, 1914. (R. 82). The board of directors of the ap-
pellant company, by refusing to deliver this decreed 
water to the Respondents, caused the lawsuit. The 
only reason they gave in their minutes for refusing to 
deliver the water was that part of the land owned by 
Lyman Skeen had been sold. (Ex. 8). As we shall 
presently see, this sale took place in 1922, and for 47 
years thereafter the water was delivered to the Re-
spondents and their predecessors. This litigation was 
filed because of this refusal to deliver the water, and 
the right of Respondents to receive this water is the 
issue the parties litigated, and it is the primary 
issue here. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents' predecessor in interest, Lyman 
Skeen, acquired the water right, which is now in liti-
gation, from Utah Power & Light Company, by a deed 
dated February 11, 1903. (Ex. H.) The Warren Irri-
gation Co., the Appellant here, succeeded to the rights 
of the power company, and thereafter in 1913 failed 
to deliver the water to Lyman Skeen in accordance 
with the 1903 deed. He filed a complaint in the Dis-
trict Court of Weber County, naming the Warren Irri-
gation Co. as the defendant. (Ex. L, Civil 4677). This 
litigation resulted in the entry of a decree, which is 
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dated November 10, 1914. The water was delivered 
by the Warren Irrigation Co. to Lyman Skeen and his 
successors in interest, in accordance with the terms 
of this decree for 55 years. The only problem the 
parties ever had during this 55 year period occurred 
in 1937 when the Appellant erroneously thought that 
it only had to furnish water when it was available in 
Four Mile Creek. (Tr. 55). When the company refused 
to deliver the water, Mary E. Brown and David A. 
Skeen, who were successors in interest to Lyman 
Skeen, (Ex. 10) filed a petition in 1937 to compel the 
delivery. They expressly alleged in paragraph 1 of 
their petition that they: 
". . are the successors in interest of the 
plaintiff above named, Lyman Skeen, and now 
are the owners of all rights given and granted 
to the plaintiff Lyman Skeen by a decree of this 
court, entered on or about November 10, 1914." 
The Warren Irrigation Co. (the appellant here) did not 
contravert that allegation, but to the contrary, in para-
graph 1 of its answer, it admitted this allegation of 
ownership. (Ex. L Civil 4677) Mr. East, who was the 
president of the appellant company, for 36 years, said 
that the dispute in 1937 was over the source of the 
water. (Tr. 55). During the trial he and the attorney 
for the appellant company. Mr. David Wilson, went to 
the courthouse. and obtained the 1914 decree. Mr. 
Wilson said: 
"We just as well go back. we're beat," (Tr. 54). 
They stopped the trial at that point, and Judge Wade 
entered the order of February 5. 1938, which we think 
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clearly found and determined that Mary E. Brown and 
David A. Skeen were the successors in interest to Ly-
man Skeen, and 
" ... are now the owners of all rights 
given and granted to the plaintiff (Lyman 
Skeen) by the decree of this court entered 
herein on November 10, 1914." (Ex. L. Civil 
420.) 
The decree ordered the delivery of the water exactly 
as the 1914 decree had, to-wit, it ordered the appel-
lant company to deliver the water to the petitioners 
for 48 hours out of every fourteen days. It assessed 
damages against the defendant for failure to deliver 
the water. There is not one single issue which was 
raised in the court below, nor which is raised here 
that could not have been raised in 1937. We will dis-
cuss this in more detail below. We note here only that 
the trial court in this case, in its Memorandum De-
cision, concluded: 
"The rights and obligations between the 
parties have been determined by previous de-
crees, which are res judicata. After living with 
these decrees for nearly fifty years, plaintiff is 
not in a position to raise issues which were or 
could have been previously settled." (R. 81) 
There really is no dispute in the evidence. The 
water has been delivered to Lyman Skeen and his 
successors in interest in accordance with the 1914 
decree at all times, except during the Summer of 1937. 
When the company refused to deliver the water in 
1937, the matter was taken to court, as noted above, 
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and the court ordered the delivery of the water. Mary 
E. Brown, who was one of the petitioners in the 1937 
litigation, was married to the rather of Respondent 
Milton Brown in 1931 or 1932. (Tr. 61 ). Milton Brown 
resided in their home, and worked on the farm. He 
was familiar with the use of water from 1933 forward. 
He received the deed to his property (Ex. 9) in October 
of 1939. 
No one at all denied that the water was delivered 
to Lyman Skeen and his said successors in interest in 
accordance with the 1914 decree, as above set forth. 
Harold M. Thompson, who was an officer and director 
of the appellant company. has been familiar with Mil-
ton Brown's farm for fifty years, and on cross-exami-
nation he testified, unequivocally. that for fifty years 
this decreed water has been used on the farm now 
owned by Milton Brown. (Tr. 21) 
Elwood F. Skeen. who was called as a witness 
by the Appellant. was the son of Lyman Skeen. He 
was born in 1908. and at that time his father was living 
on this property. (Tr. 37) He would have been about 
14 years of age in 1922 (Tr 37) When he first re-
members the farm of his father, Lyman Skeen, Lyman 
owned about 160 acres. (Tr. 40) He remembers the 
sale to his brothers. Wilford and Blaine, in 1922. (Tr. 
40). He testified unequivocally on cross-examination 
that after the sale of the two 40-acre tracts to Wilford 
and Blaine (Ex. K) the decreed water was used on the 
80 acres that Lyman had left after the sale. (Tr. 41). 
He also testified that Wilford and Blaine did not use 
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the decreed water. (Tr. 41). The witness said he had 
worked on his father's place, and had later leased it, 
and he irrigated the land which is now owned by Mil-
ton Brown, and which is shown on Ex. C. (Tr. 39). Mil-
ton Brown lived on the place since about 1933, and 
from 1933 to 1937 the only water that was available 
to irrigate the 80 acres now owned by Respondents 
was this decreed water. (Tr. 62). See also testimony 
of Morris Skeen. (Tr. 33). The Respondent, as noted 
above, acquired the property in 1939, and he received 
all of the decreed water for this land until 1969. (Tr. 
62). A survey made for Respondents indicated that 
there are 79 acres in Respondents' tract, but they 
always called it 80 acres. (Tr. 66). The 1903 deed 
from Utah Power & Light Company contained a limita-
tion on the place of use. It expressly said that the 
water could be used on 110 acres out of the 14 7 acre 
tract, and not otherwise. (Ex. H). Exhibit C shows the 
land in the Milton Brown farm, and the acreage shad-
ed in dark blue is not within the permitted acreage 
under the 1903 deed. However, this place of use lim-
itation is not carried forward in the 1914 decree, and 
the trial court expressly so found. (Finding No. 3, R. 
84). Of course, this can be confirmed by examining 
the 1914 decree, which is in evidence. (Ex. L, Civil 
4677). The evidence does not show when or for what 
reason Lyman Skeen started using water in violation 
of this restriction in the 1903 deed, nor does it show 
whether he did so, because of the 1914 decree. How-
ever, the uncontraverted evidence is that for at least 
fifty years, which goes back to the earliest memory 
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of the witnesses called, this decreed water right has 
been used on the 80 acres now owned by Milton 
Brown, and the witnesses all specifically stated that 
the land outside the 1903 deed was being irrigated. 
Harold M. Thompson. a witness for the Appellant, and 
an officer and director of appellant company, said that 
he could remember the use of the water on the Milton 
Brown farm for at least f 1fty years. and he expressly 
testified that the VJater was being used on land out-
side the 1903 deed. (Tr 21. 22) Appellant's witness, 
Elwood F. Skeen. who was born on the Lyman Skeen 
place in 1908. also expressly so test1f1ed. (Tr. 38, 39). 
He also could remember back to 1922. Respondent 
Milton Brown. who can remember since 1933. also 
expressly so testified. (Tr 67) No one testified to the 
contrary. 
The trial court. in F1nd1ng 10 (R. 87) found that 
since 1922 the water has been used on the 80 acres 
owned by Respondents. that the water has been 
assessed against the defendants and their predeces-
sors in interest: that no complaint has ever been made 
about the place of use. and that plaintiff is now bar-
red, by its own conduct. by its !aches, and its long 
acquiescence in the place of use from complaining 
that some of the water is used outside the 147 acre 
tract described in the 1903 deed. 
Harold M. Thompson expressly admitted that for 
at least fifty years. the water was so used without pro-
test from the company, (Tr 22) and Milton Brown 
testified that he never had any protest from the com-
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pany. (Tr. 67). So the court disposed of the conten-
tion that only 50 acres of the Milton Brown land could 
be irrigated on three bases: First, in Finding 3, R. 84, 
it found that the 1914 decree does not contain any 
limitations in regard to the place of use. Secondly, in 
Finding No. 9, the court found that the decreed water 
was being used on the 80 acres now owned by the 
Respondents in 1938 when the litigation occurred 
between Mary E. Brown and David Skeen, as petition-
ers, and the Warren Irrigation Company as Respond-
ent, and that the appellant company could have raised 
any issues relating to the place of use in the 1938 liti-
gation, but did not do so. (R. 87). Third, it found in 
Finding No. 10 that the water had been used on this 
80 acres since at least 1922, without protest, and that 
the Appellant is barred by its own conduct, by its 
!aches, and its long acquiescence in the place of use 
from now complaining that some of the water is used 
outside of the 147 acre tract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES HAVE AL-
READY BEEN ADJUDICATED. 
Before turning to the specific arguments of Ap-
pellant, we desire to note that this is an effort by the 
Appellant to collaterally attack the two earlier decrees 
entered against Appellant by the District Court for 
Weber County. The first litigation occurred in 1914, 
when Lyman Skeen filed his complaint in Civil No. 
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4677, alleging that Appellant was not delivering water 
to him in accordance with his rights under the 1903 
deed This litigation ended in a stipulated decree, 
which was very specific and which the court quoted 
in its findings almost in full (Finding No. 3, R. 83). It 
awarded Lyman Skeen 5 cubic feet of water for 48 
hours out of every 14 days during the months of April, 
May and June, and 4 c.f.s. every 14 days for a period 
of 48 hours during the months of July, August and 
September. The water was to be supplied from Ap-
pellant's "natural sources of supply (exclusive of its 
pumping plant)." It further provided that if there was 
not sufficient water in the natural source of supply, the 
Warren Irrigation Co. "shall be required to deliver only 
such quantity as 1t may be able to divert and deliver 
from its said sources of supply " It fixed the annual 
payment "1n full for the water supplied and furnished 
as aforesaid" at $33 per year, and it concluded by 
stating that if the rights of the plaintiff under the decree 
shall be terminated by the "foreclosure of any mort-
gage now existing on the property of the defendant, 
then and in that case. the rights of the parties hereto. 
as provided in those certain deeds and contracts set 
out as exhibits in the answer herein, shall revive and 
become in full force and effect." The two deeds which 
were attached to the answer are the 1903 deed from 
the power company to Lyman Skeen and the 1904 
deed from Lyman Skeen and his wife to the power 
company. 
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There is nothing in the record to indicate any 
trouble or dispute over the administration of this de-
cree until 1937. In 1937, the Appellant refused to de-
liver water to Mary E. Brown and David A. Skeen, who 
were the successors in interest to Lyman Skeen. (Ex. 
10) Mary E. Brown and David A. Skeen filed a petition 
in Civil No. 4677 on August 9, 1937. In that petition 
they alleged that they were the successors in interest 
of Lyman Skeen "and now are the owners of all rights 
given and granted to the plaintiff Lyman Skeen by a 
decree of this court entered herein on or about No-
vember 10, 1914." This allegation is admitted by the 
Appellant in its answer. The petitioners alleged that 
the Appellant was refusing to deliver water, and asked 
for an order directing the company to deliver the water 
to the petitioners, in accordance with the 1914 de-
cree. 
As is noted above, the then president of the com-
pany, A. D. East, and the company attorney, David 
Wilson, after finding the 1914 decree, stopped the trial 
and permitted the order of February 5, 1938 to be 
entered (Ex. L. Note: The pleadings are in Civil No. 
4677. The order is in Civil 4201.) This order expressly 
recited that the petitioners were the successors of 
Lyman Skeen, and that they "are now the owners of 
all rights" awarded to Lyman Skeen in the 1914 de-
crees. It directed the appellant company to deliver 
the water and assessed damages. 
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We won't labor this point further here, but we do 
desire to note that there is not one single issue raised 
on this appeal or in the trial court that is not related 
to things which had transpired before this 1937 liti-
gation. The irrigation of land outside that permitted 
by the 1903 deed had started sometime at or before 
1922. (Tr. 21, 38). The 40-acre tracts had been sold 
to Blaine and Wilford Skeen in 1922. (Ex. K). From 
1922 until 1938, when the order was entered, 100 per 
cent of the Skeen decreed right was delivered to Ly-
man and his successors in interest. (Tr. 21, 31, 33, 
38-40). None of it was delivered to Blaine or Wilford. 
(Tr. 31, 33, 38-40). The appellant company continued 
to assess 100 per cent of the water to Lyman Skeen 
and his successors. (Ex. 11, 12, 13). It did not assess 
any to Blaine or Wilford. (Ex. 11, 12, 13). If this trans-
fer to Blaine and Wilford in any way affected the right 
of Lyman and his successors in interest to receive the 
water, that pattern had existed for more than fifteen 
years. and could have been and should have been 
raised in the 1937 litigation. The 1904 deed from Ly-
man Skeen and his wife to the power company, which 
has a reversion clause in it, had, of course, been in 
existence since 1904. If it automatically cancelled the 
rights of Lyman Skeen and his successors, whenever 
the Appellant withheld the water, this could have been 
and should have been raised as a defense in both the 
1914 and the 1937 litigation. Any problems about the 
source of the water to supply the decreed right could 
have been raised in the 1937 litigation, which the 
court will note was only concerned with the problem 
of water sources. 
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The parties have lived by the 1914 decree for 
more than 55 years. The Appellant has twice litigated 
this right, and every issue it now raises in this action 
and on this appeal could have been raised in 1937. 
The defenses are all based on things which transpired 
before 1937, and the trial court correctly held that 
these previous decrees were res judicata. 
It is elementary law that the principles of res 
judicata apply not only to the issues which were raised 
and litigated, but also to all issues which could have 
been raised. This matter is noted in Wheadon v. 
Pearson, 14 U. 2d 45, 376 P. 2d 946. There the court 
quoted from its earlier decision in fast Mill Creek 
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 Ut. 315, 159 P. 2d 863, 
as follows: 
" ... there are two kinds of cases where 
the doctrine of res judicata is applied: In the 
one the former action is an absolute bar to the 
maintenance of the second; it usually bars the 
successful party as well as the loser; it must 
be between the same parties or their privies; it 
applies not only to points and issues which are 
actually raised and decided therein but also to 
such as could have been therein adjudicated, 
but it only applies where the claim, demand 0r 
cause of action is the same in both cases. In 
such case the courts hold that the parties 
should litigate their entire claim, demand and 
cause of action, and every part, issue and 
ground thereof, and if one of the parties fails to 
raise any point or issue or to litigate any part of 
his claim, demand or cause of action and the 
matter goes to final judgment, such party may 
not again litigate that claim, demand or cause 
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of action or any issue. point or part thereof 
which he could have but failed to litigate in the 
former action. " 
See also Wood v. Turner, 19 Ut. 2d 133, 427 P. 2d 397. 
The foregoing is also in accordance with the gen-
eral law. See 46 Am Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 417. 
The previous lawsuits. both in 1914 and 1937, 
were between the Warren Irrigation Company as the 
defendant and Lyman Skeen and his successors in 
interest as the petitioners. The water right with which 
we are concerned here is the same water right which 
was the subject matter of the two previous suits. This 
lawsuit. and both of the previous matters involved a 
failure on the part of the Appellant to deliver the 
water. In each of the two previous suits the Appel-
lant retained an attorney and filed an answer. Many 
of the arguments now being made could have been 
made in 1914. This is particularly true of the claim 
that the 1904 deed automatically cancelled both 
deeds when the Appellant failed to deliver the water. 
Also, since the assessment for the joint use of the 
canal had been assessed at $33 per year. from at 
least 1907. that problem also could have been raised 
in 1914. Not one of the matters raised in Appellant's 
brief is based on anything that happened after 1937. 
We thus submit that the matter is res judicata, and 
it should not be necessary to respond to these points, 
all of which could have been and should have been 
raised 30 to 55 years ago in previous litigation be-
tween the same parties over these same rights. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE TERMI-
NATED RESPONDENTS' WATER RIGHT, 
BECAUSE OF THE REVERSION CLAUSE IN 
THE 1904 DEED. 
There are two reasons why the reversion clause 
in the 1904 deed will not operate as Appellant con-
tends. First, this argument is barred by the two de-
crees already entered, and second, Appellant is mis-
construing the reversion clause. 
The 1904 deed was in existence when the Appel-
lant and Lyman Skeen had their lawsuit in 1914. In 
fact, the deed was attached to the answer filed by the 
Appellant in that case. (Ex. L). The complaint of Ly-
man Skeen then is the same as the complaint of the 
Respondents now - to-wit, the Appellant had cut 
down the amount of water it was delivering to Lyman 
Skeen. If this refusal to deliver water automatically 
cancelled both the 1903 and the 1904 deeds, as A~­
pellant now contends, Appellant should have raised 
that as a defense in the 1914 litigation. Apparently 
neither of the parties so construed the deeds. In his 
amended complaint, Lyman Skeen alleged that the 
parties had been making an exchange since 1896, and 
in paragraph 5 he alleged that the parties had mutu-
ally agreed that the arrangement should be perma-
nent, and that deeds would be exchanged. The Ap-
pellant admitted the exchange, admitted the execu-
tion of the deeds, and attached copies of the deeds 
to its answer. It could have asserted the defense 
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which the Appellant is trying to assert now, but it 
didn't do so. Rather, it stipulated to a decree, and for 
55 years the parties have administered the water in 
accordance with that decree. 
Again in 1937 the Appellant refused to deliver 
water, and the successors of Lyman Skeen filed a 
petition to compel them to do so. Again, this defense 
that the 1904 deed wiped out both deeds and the 1914 
decree could have been asserted as a defense. It 
was not so asserted, and the court affirmed the right 
of the petitioners in an order signed February 5, 1938, 
and for the next 30 years the parties abided by that de-
cree, without protest or problem, and the trial court 
correctly held that this issue could not be raised at 
this late date. 
Further, we submit that Appellant is misconstru-
ing the terms of the deed. There is, as noted above, a 
deed from the power company, dated February 11, 
1903, to Lyman Skeen. This was introduced as Ex. H, 
and a copy is attached to the answer of the Appellant 
in the 1914 suit. (Ex. L) Lyman Skeen and his wife. on 
February 16, 1904, gave an exchange deed to the 
power company. A copy of this deed is attached to 
Appellant's answer in Civil 4677. This 1904 deed 
contains the following language: 
"Provided always, and the above grant, 
by the party of the first part is made for the ex-
press consideration that in case the Utah Light 
& Railway Company, or its grantor, the Pioneer 
Electric Power Company, or any of its or their 
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assigns, or successors in interest, shall wil-
fully refuse to carry out the agreement to deliver 
water which is contained in the deed, to the 
party of the first part hereto, which deed is dat-
ed in the caption 11th of February, 1903, then 
the grant of the water right in their deed shall 
cease and determine, and the parties hereto 
of the first part shall be restored to all the right 
they had prior to the giving of this deed, and no 
length of time shall vary their part of this 
agreement." 
We construe this provision to say that the power 
company and its successors are obligated to deliver 
water in accordance with the agreement which is con-
tained in the 1903 deed, and if the power company 
and its successors wilfully fail to deliver the water, 
then the grant of the water right in "their deed", mean-
ing the power companys' 1904 deed, shall cease and 
determine, "and the parties hereto of the first part" 
(meaning Lyman Skeen and his wife) "shall be re-
stored to all of the right they had prior to the giving 
of this deed." (The 1904 deed). It does not say that the 
party of the second part will be restored to its rights. 
What it does say is that Lyman Skeen and his wife 
shall be restored to the rights they had before they 
gave "this deed", the 1904 deed, and that the rights 
of the power company under the 1904 deed shall 
cease and determine. 
In any event, we think this question is now moot 
It is a problem which existed in 1913, when the com-
pany wilfully failed to deliver water. It could have been 
and should have been raised as a defense to that suit. 
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It was also available as a defense in 1937, when the 
Appellant again refused to deliver water and it could 
have been and should have been raised as a defense 
to that suit. But in was not. The trial court, in Finding 
No. 6, expressly found that this claim and any other 
claim and limitations contained in the deeds could 
have been raised by the plaintiff (appellant here) in 
the previous litigation, but they were not, and in 1914 
the court issued an order which it says was in lieu of 
the deed, and in 1937 the court entered a further order 
that Respondents' predecessors owned all of the 
rights decreed to Lyman. The Appellant is more than 
55 years late in raising this argument. 
POINT Ill 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S 
FINDING IN REGARD TO THE 1914 DE-
CREE. 
There isn't any finding by the trial court that the 
1914 decree "entirely superseded the 1903 deed", 
as Appellant contends on page 14. This, in any event, 
is purely a collateral matter. Appellant does not tell 
us about anything that is in the 1903 deed which con-
tinues to control the rights of the parties, along with 
the 1914 decree. 
The finding by the trial court that the decree was 
in lieu of the deed is in Finding No. 3, and the only 
thing the court does there is quote the language of 
the 1914 decree, which expressly says: 
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"That in lieu of the provision contained in 
that certain deed dated February 11, 1903," etc. 
Lyman Skeen should receive certain water. Finding 
No. 3 in this case concludes by noting that the limita-
tion in the 1903 deed prohibiting the use of water out-
side the 14 7-acre tract was not carried forward in the 
decree. (R. 83). This is a correct finding. 
Appellant apparently wants this court to imply 
that the trial court placed its holding in regard to the 
place where the water could be used entirely on the 
fact that the limitation was not carried forward from 
the deed to the decree. It is clear, however, that this 
is not so. 
The court, after correctly noting that this limita-
tion was not carried forward into the decree, found in 
Finding No. 4 that for at least 50 years the water de-
scribed in the 1914 decree has been used on the 80 
acres which the Respondents now own. (R. 84). Then 
in Finding No. 10 (R. 87) the court found that since at 
least 1922 the decreed water had been used on Re-
spondents' 80 acre-tract, that it had been assessed 
against the Respondents and their predecessors in 
interest, no complaint has ever been made about the 
place of use, and that the plaintiff is now barred by its 
own conduct, by its laches, and its long acquiescence 
in the place of use from now complaining that some of 
the water is used outside the 14 7 acre tract described 
in the 1903 deed. 
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The court also found in Finding No. 9 that the 
water was being used outside the 147 acre tract in 
1937, when Mary E. Brown and David Skeen filed their 
petition against the Appellant, and the court expressly 
noted that the irrigation company could have raised 
any issues relating to the place of use in 1938 in that 
litigation, but did not do so. Appellant has not shown 
how it is damaged by the change in place of use. Ap-
pellant makes no effort to respond to the basis on 
which the court placed its decision. It merely makes 
the theoretic argument that the court wrongfully im-
plied that every provision of the 1903 deed was super-
seded by the 1914 decree. The court made no such 
finding, and entered no such conclusion, and we don't 
know whether as an abstract matter the issue is genu-
ine or moot. Certainly the finding that the limitation in 
the deed on the place of use was not carried forward 
into the decree is simply one detail in explanation of 
the fact that at least since 1922 the Appellant company 
and Lyman Skeen and his predecessors have ignored 
this provision of the deed and for the holding by the 
court that this is a matter that could have been and 
should have been raised in 1938. The court also 
found that the water right had been assessed to Re-
spondents and their predecessors. that they have paid 
the assessment and based on all of these matters, the 
court held that this use outside the 147 acres describ-
ed in the 1903 deed is not something the appellant 
can raise now. 
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We don't know what other provisions there are 
in the deed which Appellant contends have survived 
the decree. Certainly the schedule for delivering the 
water was expressly changed. Also, the deed pro-
vided that the water was to be furnished from the 
waters of the Weber River, Mill Creek and Four Mile. 
The decree provided that the water should be deliver-
ed from the company's natural sources of supply ··ex-
clusive of its pumping plant." 
The deed provided that in the event of shortage. 
Skeen would have to pro-rate the use of water with 
water used by others on the same system. The decree 
provided that in case there is not sufficient water in 
the natural sources of supply exclusive of the pumping 
plant the company need only deliver the quantity 
which is available. 
Both the decree and the deed provide for the 
payment of $33 per year for the use of the water. The 
language is different. The deed provides for payment 
of 30 cents per acre for each acre of water to which 
Lyman Skeen is entitled, and the decree converts this 
to $33 per year "in full for the water supplied and furn-
ished." The first paragraph of the decree states, as 
quoted above, that "in lieu of the provisions contain-
ed" in the deed, water should be delivered according 
to the decree, and the last paragraph suggests that 
the deed was fully superseded. Apparently the irri-
gation company had mortgages on its canal system 
and water rights. If the mortgages were foreclosed, it 
would, of course, supersede the decree. The last 
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paragraph said that if these mortgages of the Appel-
lant were foreclosed, thus terminating the decree, 
''. : . then and in that case, the rights of 
the parties hereto as provided in those certain 
deeds and contracts set out as exhibits in the 
answer herein shall revive and become in full 
force and effect." 
Thus, though the trial court made no finding that 
the decree totally superseded the deed, as Appellant 
asserts that it did, and although we don't know of any 
issue between the parties that makes this of any im-
portance, it clearly would appear that the decree sup-
erseded the deed, because it is inconsistent with it in 
several particulars, including the schedule for the de-
livery of water, the source of water supply, adminis-
tration in times of shortage, etc., as set forth above, 
and then the decree does use the words "in lieu of" 
in the first paragraph, and in the last paragraph talks 
of the deed being "revived," and "becoming in full 
force and effect" if the decree is terminated by the 
foreclosure of the mortgages. The decision of the 
court in regard to place of use and the rationale it 
used is correct. We don't believe that there is any 
other issue in this regard. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS AND DECREE AS ENTERED 
ARE CORRECT. 
Under its Point 3, Appellant raises five separate 
points. We now answer each of them. 
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The first point raised is whether Respondents are 
obligated to pay their share of the expenses of oper-
ating and maintaining the Appellant's canal system 
The trial court dealt with this matter in its Finding No. 
8, where it found that the decree of November 10, 
1914, fixed the basis for annual assessments at 30 
cents per acre, or $33 per year, that the assessments 
have been made on this basis for more than 58 years, 
that the $33 assessment was provided for in the orig-
inal deed of 1903, and was carried forward into the 
decree, that this was the basis for the assessment in 
1938, when further litigation was bad, and that the 
assessment against the water should be $33 per an-
num. Certainly, this finding is supported by the un-
contraverted evidence. The deed (Ex. H) does pro-
vide for an assessment of 30 cents per acre for the 
110 acres. The 1914 decree expressly provides that 
Lyman Skeen should pay each year "the sum of $33 
in full for the water supplied and furnished as afore-
said." It goes on to say that the company doesn't have 
to deliver the water, unless the annual assessment is 
paid. 
Exhibits 11, 12 and 13, which are xerox copies 
of the pages from the Appellant's books, show that 
since 1907 this is the way the parties have construed 
the deed and later the decree for the assessment 
throughout all of that time, and until the present dis-
pute arose, has been on this basis. See also testi-
mony of the Secretary of Appellant (Tr. 32). In 1922, 
Lyman Skeen apparently acquired two shares of 
stock, and the assessment made to him that year 
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shown in Ex. 13, is $33 for the Skeen water and $3.50 
for the stock. In 1923 they are combined at $37, and 
they are combined in isolated years thereafter, but in 
1924, 1925 and 1926 they are separated. 
In Ex. 12, covering the period of 1929-1950, the 
top of the ledger shows: "Skeen Right 110 - 30 cents 
per share." During many of the years the $33 appears 
as a separate item. Ex. 11, covering 1951-1969, on 
the top of the sheet again appears "110 shares at 30 
cents per share" and the water is separately assessed. 
So the deed provides for the $33. This is carried for-
ward in different language in the decree. We have 
the books of the Appellant company since 1907, and 
they show that the parties themselves have so con-
strued first the deed, and then the decree. and that 
the assessment since 1907 has been $33 per year. 
Part of the canal assessment is obviously for water 
rights and facilities acquired after the decree. See 
Tr. 27, where the witness is testifying about two pumps 
purchased for $4,400 and $4,800, and in 1945, and 
1946, the construction of a dam in 1962 for $56,527, 
and reference is made to the purchase of water in the 
Echo Reservoir on page 28. See also testimony of 
Secretary of Appellant Tr. 31-33. The 1914 decree ex-
pressly gives Lyman Skeen no interest in the pumping 
plant. It says that the water is to be furnished from the 
natural sources of supply for the canal system "ex-
clusive of its pumping plant" and as we stipulated on 
page 28, no claim is made to any water rights acquired 
after 1914. There is no rational basis for having Re-
spondents pay the same price per share as do the 
25 
stockholders in the company, who have water mas-
~ers, corporate officers and corporate expense, pump-
ing plants and after-acquired water rights and facilities 
in which we have no interest. (Tr. 33). The parties 
themselves, for more than 62 years, have placed this 
construction on the 1903 deed and the 1914 decree, 
and the court correctly held that this is the correct 
assessment. 
The next point raised by Appellant is the right of 
the defendants to irrigate land other than land from the 
14 7 acres described in the 1903 deed. We have fully 
discussed this problem on page 20 of our brief, and 
will not repeat the arguments here. 
As a part of Point B, however. the Appellant in 
one short paragraph discusses the alleged transfer of 
part of this water to Blaine and Wilford. (See page 22 
of Appellant's brief). It was this alleged transfer which 
was the reason given by the company in its minutes 
on June 5, 1969 (Ex. 8) for refusing to deliver the 
water decreed to the Respondents. It was a major 
issue in the trial court. but is disposed of by a one 
sentence comment in the argument. We think we 
ought to give the court the details on it, and now do so 
Lyman Skeen had 160 acres of land in 1922 (Tr. 
40). That year he sold 40 acres of the land to his son 
Blaine and 40 acres to his son Wilford. (Ex. K). The 
contention of the Appellant is that water was appurte-
nant to this 80 acres. and that under Section 73-1-11. 
U.C.A. 1953. the water passed with the land The 1903 
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deed (Ex. H) fixed the place of use as being 11 o acres 
out of a specifically described tract containing 147.37 
acres. The deed does not describe the particular 11 o 
acres to be irrigated. The statute on which Appellant 
relies expressly states that: 
. "If a right has been exercised in irrigating 
different parcels of land at different times the 
right shall pass to the grantee of any parc
1
el of 
land on which the right was exercised next pre-
ceding" the conveyance. 
Appellant did not show which part of Lyman's 160 
acres were being irrigated in 1922 with the Skeen 
Right. Lyman Skeen's son, Elwood, was asked (Tr. 
40) if he knew how the water was used before 1922, 
and he answered that he did not. So there is no show-
ing that the water was appurtenant (used on) the two 
tracts sold to Wilford and Blaine. 
It is, however, not contraverted that after the 
transfer to Wilford and Blaine, Lyman kept 80 acres, 
and that from 1922 until the date of this trial, the water 
in question was used on this land. We have discussed 
this above, and refer the court to the testimony of Har-
old M. Thompson, (Tr. 21, 22) and Elwood Skeen (Tr. 
39-41), Milton Brown. (Tr. 61, 62) and Morris Skeen 
Tr. 33. During all of the time between 1922 and 1939, 
a water right could be acquired by seven years of con-
tinues, open and adverse use. See Wellsville Irrigation 
Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Ut. 448, 137 
P. 2d 634. The uncontraverted evidence is that Ly-
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man Skeen and his successors used the water on the 
remaining 80-acre tract, and the trial court so found. 
(Finding No. 5, R. 84). 
Next, it is clear that neither Wilford nor Blaine 
claimed the water. The same year they acquired the 
land they gave a mortgage and they described their 
water rights as 25 shares in the Warren Irrigation Com-
pany (Ex. 4 and 5). It is equally clear that Lyman 
claimed it. Ex. 3 shows that Lyman Skeen pledged 
this water to the State of Utah. The pledge is noted on 
the Appellant's books. (Ex 3). The uncontraverted 
testimony is also to the effect that Blaine and Wilford 
never received any of the water (Tr. 33, 41, 21, 61-62, 
46). Finally, this transaction took place in 1922. The 
Appellant had a law suit with Respondents' prede-
cessors in interest, Mary E. Brown and David Skeen, 
in 1937. They filed a petition to compel the Appellant 
to deliver water to them in accordance with the 1914 
decree. They expressly alleged in their petition that 
they were the owners of "all the rights" decreed to 
Lyman Skeen in 1914. The Warren Irrigation Company 
filed an answer in that suit, and it admitted this alle-
gation. The litigation ended in an order dated Feb-
ruary 5, 1938, confirming that the petitioners "are now 
the owners of all rights given and granted" to Lyman 
Skeen in 1914. If the transfer to Blaine and Wilford 
Skeen in 1922 was a legitimate issue, certainly it 
should have been raised as a defense to the 1937 
petition. Not only did Appellant fail to raise the issue, 
it went beyond that and admitted in its pleadings, that 
Mary E. Brown and David Skeen were the owners "of 
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all rights" decreed to Lyman, and the trial court in 
1938 so ordered, and for 30 years thereafter Appellant 
has delivered the water to Respondents. Certainly, 
the trial court was correct when it found in its Memo-
randum Decision that none of the water went to Wilford 
or Blaine; that they never claimed it; and that the Ap-
pellant is not in a position to claim it for them, and in 
its further notation that the parties have lived with the 
1914 decree, which was strengthened by the 1938 de-
cree, and the rights and obligations of the parties are 
res judicata. The court also found in detail the facts 
as recited above in regard to Wilford and Blaine in its 
finding No. 5. (R. 84 ). 
The contention made under Point C is that the 
court should have made some finding or decree about 
relative priorities. This was not an issue, and it isn't 
one now. The issue was whether or not Respondents 
owned 100 per cent of the 1914 decreed right, and 
the court held that they did. It didn't modify that de-
cree as to source, or in any other way. It simply settled 
that issue. The findings were served on the attorney 
for Appellant on the 8th day of July, 1971. The decree 
was not prepared at that time, and was not sent to the 
plaintiff's attorney until the 15th of July. They were 
then sent on to the court and entered on July 18th. 
During this period of time counsel made no objection 
to the form of the findings or to their failure to deal with 
additional issues, and no motions were made before 
the appeal was filed. The trial court committed no 
error in this regard. 
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The next point, which is raised on page 22 of 
Appellant's brief, is a fictitious claim that the water 
cannot be beneficially used. This argument ignores 
the holding of the court that for 50 years the 80 acre 
tract now owned by Milton Brown has been irrigated 
by this water, and for all the reasons noted above, the 
Appellant can't question the place of use now. The 
engineer called by the Appellant testified that in gen-
eral, land in this area needs 3 acre feet of water per 
acre per year. (Tr. 10). On 80 acres this would require 
240 acre feet. Appellant's expert also testified that if 
water were delivered strictly in accordance with the 
amounts required by the 1914 decree, Respondents 
would receive 252 acre feet during the irrigation sea-
son. (Tr. 9). This is only 12 feet more than the expert 
indicated would be needed under a three acre foot 
duty. On cross-examination he was asked if he had 
tried to make a precise determination for this particu-
lar 80-acre tract, and he said that he had not. He was 
asked if he might be in error as much as 10 or 15 per 
cent, and he said "Yes". (Tr. 11 ). Milton Brown, who 
has irrigated this tract since 1933, and makes his living 
as a farmer (Tr. 61, 62) testified that he needs all of the 
water for the 80 acre tract which he owns. (Tr. 63). 
Elwood Skeen, who was born on the ranch, had irri-
gated it, and finally leased it, was asked about the 
need for the water. {Tr. 38). He said that sometimes 
they had to skip some lucerne or something like that, 
to move it around to make enough water for the land 
until the grain matured, and then the Skeen right pro-
vided enough water. So again we assert that there is 
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no conflict in the evidence The testimony of Re-
spondent that he needed all of the water on the 80 
acres is consistent with the testimony of the engineer 
of three acre feet (plus or minus 10-15%) is needed. 
The court made an express finding on this matter. 
(Finding 9, R. 87). It found that the water has been 
used on this 80 acre tract since 1922, and that "the 
entire 252 acre feet of water produced by said right 
can be and has been beneficially usec on said 80 
acres." 
The final point on page 24 1s also not an issue. 
We do not claim, the court did not rLle, and there was 
no issue about water rights acquired after 1914. The 
1914 decree gives us the right to receive a specified 
amount of water from the Appellant's natural sources 
of supply, exclusive of its pumping plant. All the trial 
court did here in that regard was to hold that Respond-
ents own 100 per cent of that decreed right 
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment 
should be affirmed. 
CL YOE, MECHAM & PRATI 
EDWARD W. CL YOE 
351 South State Street 
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Attorneys tor Respondents 
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